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We use Fairness Theory to help explain why sometimes 
security policy sometimes backfire and increase security 
violations. Explanation adequacy—a key component of 
Fairness Theory—is expected to increase employees’ trust 
in their organization. This trust should decrease internal 
computer abuse incidents following the implementation of 
security changes. 
The results of our analysis provide support for Fairness 
Theory as applied to our context of computer abuse. First, 
the simple act of giving employees advance notification 
for future information security changes positively 
influences employees’ perceptions of organizational 
communication efforts. The adequacy of these 
explanations is also buoyed by SETA programs. Second, 
explanation adequacy and SETA programs work in 
unison to foster organizational trust. Finally, 
organizational trust significantly decreases internal 
computer abuse incidents. Our findings show how 
organizational communication can influence the overall 
effectiveness of information security changes among 
employees and how organizations can avoid becoming 
victim to their own efforts. 
Keywords 
Fairness theory, computer abuse, organizational trust, 
security training and awareness, explanation adequacy 
INTRODUCTION 
The need to secure sensitive organizational data is 
increasingly vital to organizations in today’s global 
information environment. Although information security 
is a longstanding need, it has grown in importance over 
time with increased globalization and computing 
complexity. While most organizations had minimal 
security controls in place almost two decades ago, recent 
studies have shown that expenditures for security controls 
are rapidly rising. These increases are likely because 
security breaches and associated losses are also increasing 
at a rapid rate.  
Although security agendas have traditionally focused on 
threats external to the organization, breaches stemming 
from internal employees are considered to be among the 
greatest threats to the security of organizational 
information systems. Although some research shows that 
individuals’ perceptions of sanctions decrease misuse of 
internal systems by employees [1, 2], contrasting research 
points to an increased frequency of computer abuse soon 
after the imposition of changes to security policies and 
procedures [3]. These contrasting findings indicate there 
are likely scenarios where increased deterrence measures 
may backfire and create a paradox of increased—not 
decreased—internal computer abuse.  
In this study, we explain how organizations can increase 
security yet avoid such a paradox by building on the 
underlying foundation of organization trust and Fairness 
Theory.  
Fairness Theory  
Fairness Theory [4, 5] explains the methods individuals 
use in order to provide explanations for various 
organizational events they perceive as unfair. A recent 
meta-analytic review showed that Fairness Theory can 
predict the results of various kinds of explanations. For 
our purposes, we apply Fairness Theory in the narrow 
context of negative organizational decisions where it has 
been very effective in allowing researchers to explain 
individuals’ reactions to negative events and decisions [6-
9]. From this perspective, Fairness Theory posits that 
when employees experience a negative organizational 
event they have an inherent need to assign blame or 
accountability to the decision maker—an individual, a 
group of individuals, or an organization—for the event.  
Fairness Theory predicts that the type of explanation 
given and the explanation’s adequacy—the extent to 
which explanations provided by the organization are 
clear, reasonable, and detailed [10]—are what will 
fundamentally determine whether an employee feels a 
decision is fair with regard to negative management 
decisions [6]. Explanation adequacy is an important 
concept in the study of organizational fairness as it also 
refers to informational fairness or information justice [11, 
12]. Employees who feel a decision is fair are more likely 
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to accept and follow it, whereas employees who feel a 
decision is unfair are more likely to reject it. Fairness 
Theory predicts this process of reacting to a negative 
decision, and associated explanation (if any), as follows: 
When an employee experiences a negative event, this 
triggers “counterfactual reasoning in an effort to 
understand [the negative event]” [6, p. 671]. These 
counterfactuals—Would, Could, and Should—form the 
basis to which an employee compares the negative event 
as the individual places “what ‘is’ side by side with ‘what 
might have been’” [4, pp. 5-6]. This contrastive 
perspective proffered by counterfactuals serves as a frame 
of reference for the individual [4]. The Would 
counterfactual is based on the hypothesized condition that 
would have resulted had a feasible, alternative decision 
been made. This counterfactual assists the individual in 
answering the question, “Would my well-being have been 
better off if this event had played out differently?” [10, p. 
447]. The employee then evaluates the discrepancy 
between the actual and the hypothetical scenario with the 
magnitude of the difference having a direct bearing on 
perceived fairness. The larger the negative difference, the 
more likely a decision will be seen as unfair.  
The other two counterfactuals largely determine whether 
the generated fairness/unfairness judgment becomes 
solidified. A Could counterfactual “addresses whether the 
negative event was under the decision maker’s 
discretionary control” [6, p. 671]. To clarify, conduct that 
is discretionary describes another’s choices among 
feasible alternatives [4]. Ceteris paribus, the more an 
employ considers a negative decision to be made under an 
employer’s discretionary control, the more likely the 
employee will judge the decision as unfair. Similarly, 
Could counterfactuals answer the question of “Could the 
decision maker have acted differently: were there other 
feasible behaviors?” [10, p. 447]. If employees understand 
that different actions could not have been taken, they 
cannot realistically assign blame to the decision maker 
[4]. 
Should counterfactuals “address moral or ethical conduct 
and suggest that [individuals] also evaluate whether the 
decision maker acted in accordance with appropriate 
standards” [6, p. 671]. This assessment provides an 
individual with the answer as to whether the decision 
maker should have acted differently relative to a set of 
standards [4]. Anything perceived as unethical or immoral 
will generate a negative Should counterfactual, and will 
be much more likely to solidify an unfairness judgment. 
Strong Should counterfactuals can also emanate from the 
decision maker’s deviation from standards based on 
industry norms, training, and so forth. A security example 
would be if an employee works with sensitive materials 
and is trained in the importance of using encryption to 
protect sensitive materials, they will generate a much 
more positive Should counterfactual if they are told that 
all organizational email communication must use a 
particular encryption standard than an employee without 
awareness of these standards or their purposes. 
Advanced Notification of Security Changes 
Advance notice is a vital component of fair systems. 
Brockner et al. [13] explained that procedures are unfair if 
decision makers implement them without regard for the 
legitimate concerns of those affected—such as reasonable 
preparation to deal with the adverse consequences of a 
decision. Accordingly, a security change will more likely 
be seen as unfair, and subsequently not be embraced, if an 
organizational simply rolls out a security change without 
explanation or with an explanation after-the-fact. The 
fundamental reason why this will occur—from a Fairness 
Theory perspective—is that the lack of timely explanation 
or a complete lack of explanation will increase the 
likelihood and strength of Could counterfactuals. Without 
prior notification and explanation, a decision is more 
likely to be seen as having no factual basis, heavy handed, 
or capricious. Conversely, a thoughtful and timely 
explanation can help an employee believe a new policy is 
reasonable and factual. 
H1: Advance notification increases perceived explanation 
adequacy. 
Organizational SETA Efforts and Explanation Adequacy 
The construct of explanation adequacy\not only applies to 
whether advance notification is given but also to whether 
the explanation itself is sound and reasonable. 
Explanation adequacy can affect the generation of Could 
counterfactuals, because absent of explanation, one is not 
fully capable of determining whether other feasible 
options existed and hence whether the organization had 
control over the decision. In other words, these 
counterfactuals may not be realistic and thus result in an 
exaggerated magnitude. As a security example, suppose 
an employee does not understand that a three-character 
password is exponentially less secure than a ten-character 
password; such an employee is more likely to see a three-
character password option as reasonable and that a new 
policy mandating ten-character passwords is not 
necessary and that the organization could have taken other 
approaches.  
Given this background, it is not surprising that the 
organizational literature shows that “the failure to give an 
explanation—or the use of an inadequate one—can lead 
to negative employee reactions” [10, p. 453], especially in 
the event of unfavorable or constraining outcomes to 
employees. Conversely, when employees receive sincere, 
detailed explanations, they respond more positively to the 
associated change [10, 14, 15]. 
However, because security itself can be highly technical 
and arcane, logic and explanations may be inadequate—
thus creating unrealistic or distorted counterfactuals—
because employees may simply not understand the 
fundamental issues involved. Lack of understanding of 
security principles and standards may also cause 
misleading Should counterfactuals, as these are based on 
ethical, moral, and industry standards.  
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Organizations might be able to produce more positive 
counterfactuals in its employees if it has a formal SETA 
program. These programs can be especially effective 
because they “inform employees about their roles, and 
expectations surrounding their roles, in the observance of 
information security requirements” [16, p. 51]. 
Specifically, SETA programs are based on a comparative 
framework and are implemented (1) to improve employee 
awareness of what threats exist to organizational 
information assurance, (2) to train employees on how to 
perform their jobs in a secure manner, and, (3) to educate 
employees regarding why these threats exist. Accordingly, 
we define organizational SETA efforts as the degree with 
which an organization formally provides its employees 
with an awareness of what threats exist in the work 
environment, why these threats exist, and notification of 
how they can more securely engage in work activities. In 
addition, SETA programs represent a rather low-cost 
initiative relative to the increased costs of security 
breaches [17]. This educational process is vital in 
notifying employees of the behaviors that are not 
acceptable and provides the foundation on which 
organizations may reasonably improve their security 
posture if required.  
H2: Appropriate SETA programs increase perceived 
explanation adequacy. 
Organizational SETA Efforts and Organizational Trust 
Changes to information security measures can negatively 
affect organizational members via changes to daily job 
tasks [18] and lead to increased job stress and insider 
abuse [3]. Such unfavorable conditions serve as the 
igniting spark for the counterfactual thinking process 
suggested by Fairness Theory [4]; however, organizations 
once again have the ability to decrease the discrepancy 
between “what is” and “what would, could, and should 
be” in the minds of employees by building organizational 
trust through SETA efforts. Organizational trust is 
defined as “one’s expectations, assumptions, or beliefs 
about the likelihood that another’s future actions will be 
beneficial, favorable, or at least not detrimental to one’s 
interests” [19, p. 576] and is based on several key 
characteristics. Because many employees view additional 
information security measures as constraining and time 
consuming at the very least, organizational trust is 
developed largely from the organization’s assurance to its 
employees that it will abide by and engage in actions of 
the least detrimental fashion by its adherence to those key 
characteristics. 
When organizations properly design SETA efforts and 
engage their employees in them [20], these activities also 
provide the forum in which employees can better assess 
the organization’s ability to properly handle information-
security matters, one of the more significant aspects of 
organizational trust [21, 22]. Moreover, SETA programs 
provide organizations with the best opportunity to overtly 
express the standards by which they operate. In the end, 
these sets of guiding operational principles via SETA 
programs ultimately provide an instrument by which an 
employee is able to gauge the organization’s actual 
security activities and whether the organization is worthy 
of the employees’ continued trust. 
H3: Appropriate SETA programs increase organizational 
trust. 
Explanation Adequacy and Organizational Trust 
Organizational trust is a key outcome of organizational 
fairness Because explanation adequacy equates to 
informational fairness or justice, organizational 
explanations can foster organizational trust and perceived 
support [23]. Employee trust will increase as management 
conducts activities with clear and open communication 
[23], but these explanations lose their efficacy and may 
even be counterproductive unless they are deemed sincere 
and believable [24]. This word-deed misalignment 
ultimately undermines trust in organizations. Providing 
both justifications and advance notice may therefore 
enhance perceived behavioral integrity and post-
implementation trust [23]. In contrast, implementing new 
security policies without properly notifying employees 
might be considered a breach of trust that is viewed as 
suspicious, as having little credibility, and as 
manipulative [23]. Blau [25] argued that ‘‘the 
establishment of exchange relationships requires others to 
reciprocate. Since social exchange requires others to 
reciprocate, the initial problem is to prove oneself 
trustworthy.’’ Accordingly, actions that establish and 
reinforce trust therefore engender an obligation on the 
part of employees to reciprocate [23].  
Organizational explanations for information-security 
activities that are deemed as adequate, thorough, 
reasonable, and timely by employees are likely to be 
perceived as candid communication. This openness is 
another key facet in employees’ development of trust in 
their organizations. The building and maintaining of 
organizational trust is particularly important in the design 
and implementation of organizational security practices 
such as monitoring and surveillance, because these 
activities tend to produce feelings of distrust within 
organizational members. Stanton and Stam [18] note: 
“precipitous changes in the organization’s monitoring and 
surveillance policies and practices are the ones most 
likely to raise eyebrows and erode the trust that 
employees have in their organization” (p. 75). 
H4: Perceived explanation adequacy increases 
organizational trust. 
Organizational Trust and Internal Computer Abuse 
Trust is an important predictor of a number of key 
organizational outcomes including organizational 
citizenship behavior [26]. The outcome of the 
counterfactual process in our model—organizational 
trust—is an essential element in determining how 
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employees respond to negative organizational events. For 
example, the effects of employees’ disagreements with 
managers [27], perceived psychological contract breaches 
[19], and organizational downsizing [28] are all 
attenuated by organizational trust. Organizations that 
enhance their information-security measures should also 
be able to leverage the positive influences of employees’ 
trust to their benefit. 
Employees who trust their organization are more likely to 
behave beneficially toward their organization because 
they believe the organization is looking out for them. 
Conversely, individuals who have little trust in their 
organization are more likely have been found to act in 
counterproductive [29] or antisocial ways [30]. Because 
organizational trust exists when employees believe that 
the actions of their organization “will be beneficial, 
favorable, or at least not detrimental to one’s interests” 
[19, p. 576], employees who do not experience such 
beliefs are more likely to be self-serving [31] and deviant, 
because they expect the organization will not act in the 
best interest of the employee [30].  
H5: Organizational trust decreases computer abuse.  
METHODOLOGY 
Data Collection 
An online panel composed of 397 full-time employees 
from the banking, financial, and insurance industries was 
used to obtain data for testing our research model. To 
qualify for the study, each respondent had to utilize their 
organization’s computer systems in fulfilling their daily 
job tasks. Anonymity was guaranteed for each 
respondent. Anonymity is important in obtaining honest, 
self-report responses to questions regarding a sensitive 
subject like internal computer abuse [32].  
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We analyzed our theoretical model with the structural 
equation modeling program AMOS 16.0 and followed the 
two-step method suggested by prior methodological 
research. Factorial validity was established using standard 
approaches and common methods bias was not present. 
The final results are summarized in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Model Testing Results 
DISCUSSION 
The results imply several practical implications. First, the 
results show how important organizational 
communication to insiders is. Individuals whose 
organizations make the effort to discuss information 
security changes prior to their implementation perceive a 
greater degree of explanation adequacy than those who 
were told after. This seemingly underestimated or 
overlooked action (i.e., a surprising 41% of our sample) 
by firms significantly relates to the variance exhibited in 
insiders’ perception of explanation adequacy. 
Second, organizational security education, training, and 
awareness programs built on the what, how, and why 
comparative framework suggested by security researchers 
[20] serves at least two main functions: (1) the programs 
provide the foundation from which organizational insiders 
can better gauge organizational communication efforts 
regarding information security initiatives; and, (2) the 
programs build the organizational trust beliefs of insiders 
as they show the competence and/or the benevolence of 
the organization. H inconsistencies in communication 
received and/or perceived by insiders could be 
detrimental to the effectiveness of the information 
security initiatives. 
Third, adequate explanations also provide reasoning for 
information security initiatives thereby increasing trust 
within the organization. It is important to reiterate that 
these two variables—explanation adequacy and SETA 
efforts—explain nearly half of the variance in 
organizational trust perceptions in our results. 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, this research shows 
that organizational trust derived from organizational 
communication efforts significantly decreases internal 
computer abuse within organizations. Individuals’ trust in 
their organizations accounts for almost one-fifth of the 
self-reported abuses. More work is requisite to explore 
other variables that significantly relate to internal 
computer abuses; however, we feel that this research 
provides an important, initial step in assessing the 
antecedents of a construct of such interest to both 
information security researchers and practitioners.  
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